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This study examines the relationship between director 
remuneration and performance in Malaysia family firms. The 
proxies of director remuneration include fees, salary, bonuses, 
and benefits of kin. The proxy for family firm is a dummy 
variable that is one (1) if the firm is a family firm and zero (0) is 
a non-family firm. The dependent variable (performance) is 
measured by ROA and ROE. A panel analysis of 537 firms 
from 2007 and 2009 finds that the relationship between 
director remuneration and performance is significantly 
positive. This suggests that the remuneration driven board 
motivation to enhance performance. Furthermore, this study 
does not find evidence the family firm manipulated a power 
and control for personal wealth. 
 
JEL Code:  G30, G32 and G34 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Implementation of corporate governance provides better insight for better 
achievement.  Component of corporate governance such as board composition, 
board of director, audit committee, remuneration become a subject for many scholars 
(Christopher & Hassan 2005; Durisin & Puzone 2009; Filatotchev 2009). Demb and 
Neubauer (1992) explain the frame of corporate governance as the responsibility for 
firm performance. These components need to be integrated and matched with firm 
strategies towards enhancing performance. For example, under the component 
board structure context, board composition (Dalton et al. 1998), board size (Jensen 
1993) and meetings are required to review and establish effectiveness during 
implementation. Similar to the remuneration structure involved with a remuneration  
committee (Hussin & Salim 2009), the level of remuneration (Abdul Wahab & Abdul 
Rahman 2009) and structure of the remuneration (Mehran 1995) need to be looked 
as a whole package, not as individual components. Such a holistic approach can 
positively improve governance practice. 
 
General task of board of director run a business and provide advises to management 
related to the executive remuneration and protect shareholder investment. Better 
remuneration is able to driven board of director motivation to fulfil firm objectives. 
Existing literature examine the executive remuneration impact to the firm 
performance (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia 1998; Bartholomeusz & Tanewski 2006; 
Cheng & Firth 2006; Croci et al. 2010). Fama & Jensen (1983) explain that the 
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effective incentives provided to executive tend to mitigate agency problem and 
enhance firm performance which is similar study by Lazear (2000) and Murphy 
(1999).  Furthermore, Hassan et al. (2003) study in Malaysia firms pre- and during 
Asian financial crisis (i.e. 1996 to 1998) find that weak relation between director 
remuneration and performance though is positive. However, the remuneration is less 
effective to enhance firm performance when applied in family firm because conflict of 
interest exists between majority and minority shareholder.  
 
La Porta et al. (1999) notices that most companies in the world are dominated by 
family or state, and this is a common practice in Asian countries (Claessens et al. 
1999; Tam & Tan 2007). A study by Claessens et al. (1999) indicates that 67.2% of 
companies in Malaysia are in family hands, followed by Thailand with 61.6% and the 
Philippines with 40%. Indonesia has a higher rate of family ownership of public 
companies, around 68.8%. Thus, this provides opportunity for family members at 
family firms tend to keep the top positions. Moores & Craig (2008), family firms prefer 
to keep top management in the hands of family members rather than hiring qualified 
outsiders. This shows that the possibly executive family be awarded higher 
remuneration without links on performance and abilities. As a result, family firm 
perform worse than non family firm (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Miller & Le Breton‐Miller 
2006; Villalonga & Amit 2006). Implication of this notion contribute seriously on 
agency problem among majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Jiang & 
Peng 2010; Young et al. 2008). Remuneration becomes a subject of expropriation in 
family firm due to unable to enhance firm performance rather than increase personal 
benefit.  
 
Based on the sample size of this study of 537 firms listed in Bursa Malaysia with 
1611 pieces of panel data from 2007 and 2009, we find a significantly find the 
relationship between director remuneration and performance. Further analysis find no 
evidence family firm uses power and control to reduce effectiveness of remuneration 
to increase firm performance.  
 
The remaining chapters are organized as follows: Chapter 2 outlines the relevant 
literature while developing fully the ideas in past research that are most important to 
the present study. The research design issues and methodology are explored in 
Chapter 3. Details of the final sample and the measurement of variables are also 
discussed in this chapter. The results and discussion are presented in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 sets out the study’s conclusions, limitations, and some suggestions for 
further research. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
Implementation of corporate governance is very important in business world in 
provides transparent and valuable of information for shareholder related to 
investment decision making. There is component of corporate governance consists 
of board composition, board of director, audit committee and remuneration which is 
possibly beneficial for firm and shareholder. Accordingly to Demb & Neubauer (1992) 
notice the frame of corporate governance as the responsibility for firm performance. 
This indicates that each element of corporate governances has possibility to align 
similar interest between manager and shareholder to fulfilling firm objectives.  
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The literature generally suggests better remuneration should links with the business 
strategy and objectives of company. The relationship between remuneration and 
performance has been discussed widely among researchers (Barkema & Gomez-
Mejia 1998; Bartholomeusz & Tanewski 2006; Cheng & Firth 2006; Croci et al. 2010). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) explain that effective incentives provided to executives tend 
to mitigate the agency problem and enhance firm performance, as shown by (Lazear 
2000; Murphy 1999). Furthermore, the study of Hassan et al. (2003) on Malaysia 
firms before and during the Asian financial crisis (i.e., 1996 to 1998) finds a weak 
relation between director remuneration and performance, though it is positive.  
 
Remuneration need to be better in order to retain and remaining quality of board 
because they have capability to achieve long term success. Regarding of this, board 
of director is awarded with better remuneration when firm satisfied with abilities such 
as skills, knowledge and experience. Accepted remuneration as a contract put 
responsibility towards board to work harder with great strategies and planning.  As a 
result, business is operated smooth and well which is possibly enhance performance. 
Doucouliagos et al. (2007) finds no evidence that director remuneration is sensitive 
towards poor performance rather than better performance. Conyon and Murphy 
(2000) study on UK and US companies find evidence on pay and performance.  
 
Board is motivated to keep performance improved when the pay is equivalent with 
their effort. Thus, they will try to provide a creative way and ideas in order to keep 
long term success. They also willing to spend all day and extra work in order to 
ensure the firm are on track to achieve better performance. For example, study 
conducted by Paarsch and Shearer (2000) on the British Columbia tree-planting 
industry indicates that incentives increased productivity by almost 173 trees per day, 
about of 22.6%. They also find that the workers were willing to undertake extra work 
due to the incentive’s being based on productivity. In contrast, under a fixed salary 
system, the worker contribution is at a minimum level compared with incentive 
schemes under which workers maximize effort, thus increasing productivity (Paarsch 
& Shearer 2000). Chen et al (2006) explain that the poor incentives to top manager 
are able to put forward for firm poor performance.  
 
Previous studies show mixed results related to relationship between remuneration 
and performance. Dogan & Smyth (2002) study in public listed companies in 
Malaysia found that no relationship between board of director and firm performance. 
In other hand, other study found that the relationship between remuneration and 
performance is negative significant (Croci et al. 2010). They also found that CEO 
compensation in family firm is negatively related to performance.  However, study by 
Doucouliagos et al. (2007) found that the relationship between CEO compensation 
and performance is positively significant. Discussion stated at above show that the 
relationship between remuneration and performance is still open for discussion 
regarding to the agency theory perspective.  
 
Lazear (2000) notice that provides a financial incentives is effect to the firm 
performance. However, the remuneration is less effective to motive board of director 
to increase firm performance when applied to family ownership. Other perspectives 
argue that the family firm is very unique because family members dominated in top 
positions (i.e. CEO, Chairman, Board of director)  and major shareholders provides 
widely opportunity for expropriation (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Claessens & Fan 2002; 
Jiang & Peng 2010; La Porta et al. 1999). They are paid large amounts of money but 
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less capability to increase performance because are not appointed based truly on 
their abilities rather than on family ties. Furthermore, family groups prefer to hire 
unqualified family members, friends, or cronies than to look for better-qualified 
candidates (Faccio et al. 2001; Moores & Craig 2008). This probably makes it easier 
to extract profits even if a firm is underperforming. According to Brick et al. (2006), in 
U.S. firms, higher remuneration to executives is linked to underperformance because 
of cronyism. Cronyism is a sensitive issue in family firms due to the blood 
relationships.  
 
The positive relationship between family ownership and director remuneration may 
be due to the altruism issue, when the parents’ estate and share transfer intention 
moderates the effect of these pay incentives (Schulze et al. 2003). Parents believe 
that they are responsible for bringing wealth to family members and use emotion in 
setting remuneration, which is influenced by the perception of the competence of the 
executive (Moores & Craig 2008). Another reason is family members have a right to 
take a portion of the profits for their personal interest without getting permission from 
other shareholders because the firm is belong to them because they are founder of 
the firm. 
  
There is mixed results show related to family ownership and remuneration. Chen & 
Lee (2008) notice that the family executive willing to accept lower remuneration to 
maintain a firm reputation. Cheung et al (2005) study in Hong Kong public listed 
companies found negative relationship between family ownership and remuneration. 
Another finding show that family executive receives lower remuneration compare with 
their counterpart (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2003). Contradicted results show that there is 
positive relation between family ownership and remuneration, for example Haid & 
Yurtoghu (2006) found that family firm pay higher remuneration for their CEO rather 
than non family firm.  Basu et al. (2007) found that Japanese executive receive 
higher remuneration in firm with higher ownership.  
 
Family member has advantages to be awarded higher remuneration although they 
are fewer capabilities to enhance performance. They are appointed related to the 
families’ ties rather than performance and abilities criteria. Implication of this notion is 
firm facing difficulty on financial matter and may be influence business operation. 
Past studies show that there is negative relationship between family ownership and 
firm performance (Basu et al. 2007; Brick et al. 2006).  According to Hill (1996) 
explains that the higher remuneration less links to performance potentially can be 
damaging the corporate, shareholder, creditor and worker morale. Basu et al. (2007) 
finds that the higher ownership and monitoring is negative relation with performance 
and consistent with the agency theory prediction that the majority shareholder 
focuses on personal benefit than maximization profit.  
 
There is mixed results show related to family ownership and performance, for 
example Abe et al (2005) study in Japan found that the pay performance is positive 
related to non-keiretsu firms. In Korea context, positive relationship between pay and 
performance related to non Chaebol firms (Kato et al. 2007).  Furthermore, Maury 
(2006) notice that the active family executive can improve the firm profitability. In 
other hand, study by Croci et al (2010) found that CEO compensation in family firm is 
negatively related to performance. Discussion stated at above show that the 
relationship between family ownership and performance still open for discussion 
related to the agency theory perspective.  
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Discussion stated above look the separately relationship between remuneration, 
family firm and performance. This indicates that there is less study focus on 
expropriation issues related to director remuneration and performance in family firm 
in Malaysia context.  We expect that the family firm manipulated a power and control 
to reward higher remuneration but less perform.  Thus, the following hypotheses:  
 
H1: There is weaker relationship between director remuneration and firm 
performance in family firm 
 
Many studies test hypothesis regarding to remuneration and family firm (Basu et al. 
2007; Haid & Yurtoglu 2006) and performance and family firm (Abe et al. 2005; 
Maury 2006) and there are mixed results presented. However, there is less studies 
focus on relationship between director remuneration and performance in Malaysia 
family firm.  The higher remuneration awarded to family executives without go along 
with better performance, shows the possibly expropriation is practices in family firm.  
 
3. Research Methodology  
 
3.1 Sample and Model  
 
The sample comprises balanced data for 537 firms and 1611 firm-year observations 
from Malaysian companies over a three-year period between 2007 and 2009. The 
2007-2009 periods was chosen because disclosure, as required under the Malaysia 
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG), was made effective for annual reports after 
June 2001 that details the activities of the executive pay structure, and the level of 
remuneration. The company data obtained from Bursa Malaysia included information 
on 762 family firms and 849 non-family firms.  
 
This study includes only cash-based remuneration for the sample period. Although 
the disclosure of director remuneration in Malaysia has significantly improved since 
the implementation of MCCG, the remuneration information is not available in 
electronic form and, thus, must be manually collected from annual reports. The 
annual reports are available from Bursa Malaysia (www.bursamalaysia.com). 
 
The data will be extracted from Bursa Malaysiai website link to the company. The 
reason is many companies interested to listing on Bursa Malaysiaii are because: a) 
simple and clear requirements for listings, b) effective cost listing destination and c) 
transparent and fully automated marketplace.  From these sources, data is obtained 
from companies’ annual reports 2009 period. The 2009 periods has been chosen 
because disclosure, as required under the Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG), is made effective for annual reports after June 2001 which detail out the 
activities of remuneration committee, executive pay structure and level of 
remuneration.  
 
This model relates remuneration variables to firm performance with aim of identifying 
expropriation in family owned companies. The remuneration variables are director, 
executive and non executive remuneration (Abdul Wahab & Abdul Rahman 2009). 
Previous research shows that the firm performance (proxies by ROA and ROE) is 
related to size, age, debt and incorporate which is need to be control (Anderson & 
Reeb 2003; Carrasco-Hernandez & Sanchez-Marin 2007; Chalmers et al. 2006; 
Jaafar, Wahab & James 
209 
 
Martinez et al. 2007; Maury 2006). This study use linear regression to test 
hypotheses and following regression analysis with econometric model: 
 
Equation (1) describes the model used to test the relationship between performance 
and director remuneration, family ownership and control variables. 
 
PERM = β0 + β1REMit + β2FAM_FIRMit + (β3REMit* FAM_FAM) + β4 SIZEit + 5DEBTit 
+ β6 AGEit + β7 INDit + єit ………………………………………………………...(1) 
 
3.2  Dependent Variable 
 
The performance is dependent variable proxies by accounting-based measures such 
as Return on Assets (ROA) is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets and 
Return on Equity (ROE) is measured as the ratio of net income to total equity. The 
interesting fact is that the ROA and ROE are the profitability ratios in accounting 
statements which reflect the shareholders’ wealth.  Furthermore, ROA is the best 
measures for current performance (Cornett et al. 2007) whereas ROE is better 
measures of executives’ ability.    Kiel and Nicholson (2003, p.196) explain: 
 
“accounting-based (ROA and ROE) measures of performance are historical 
and so experience a more backward and inward looking focus, including the 
past successes of advice given from the board to the management team and 
are the traditional mainstay of corporate performance measures”.  
 
Kaplan (1994) finds that there is positive relationship between remuneration and 
performance and closely tied with executive remuneration (Bushman & Smith 2001). 
This past studies strongly affirms suggestion by Cadbury (1992) remuneration links 
to performance as a factor determination on director remuneration. These measures 
are determined whether by providing remuneration is associated with fulfil firm 
objective or otherwise. For example, if the result show the remuneration is associate 
with performance the firm objective is achieve and if not other way round. Following 
by positive relationship links to the ability of the firm to pay out dividend.  
 
Data was obtained via annual report under section financial report sub section profit 
and loss account and balance sheet and be formulated. When information is related 
to the data is confuse or unclear further step is look into note to the account which is 
explain further detail.  Furthermore, all annual report was provided to Bursa Malaysia 
disclosure into 2 years include current year and previously so that the data can be 
extracted at the same time.   
 
3.3  Independent Variables  
 
3.3.1 Director Remuneration  
 
Total cash based director remuneration (DIRREM) which is independent variable is 
consists of executive and non executive remunerations.  The proxy for cash basic is 
consists of fees, salary, bonus and benefit of kin.  This measure which is applied in 
this has been widely used in prior research (i.e. Abdul Wahab & Abdul Rahman 
2009; Basu et al. 2007; Jensen & Murphy 1990; Ozkan 2007). Cash remuneration 
becomes popular as a incentive, because directors is closest to the maximum profit 
(Bushman & Smith 2001). Furthermore, Dong & Ozkan et al (2008) in their study 
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notice that almost 70% of CEO remuneration in UK companies consists of cash pay.  
Similar study by Murphy (1985) in US companies where salary and bonus a major 
component of the executive remuneration which is constitute 80%.  The executive 
and non executive remuneration are consists of salary, fees and allowances, benefits 
and bonus.  All remuneration variables are based on logarithm transformations, 
where statistical relationship could be weaken related to skewed distribution and lead 
heterosdasticity (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). 
 
Director remuneration data was obtains from annual report in Bursa Malaysia form as 
the level of remuneration and structure of executive and non executive in cash 
remuneration. The annual report was disclosure in form as salary, bonus, benefit of 
kin and fees for each categorize whether executive of director or non executive 
director. If the cash remuneration is disclosure as an aggregate without segregate 
each components, the data is not be taken due to difficulty to identify the level of 
remuneration. Similarly when the total remuneration fail to fall within executives 
categories, the samples are not be taken due to difficulty to identify the total 
remuneration earn by family members or otherwise 
 
3.3.2 Family Firm 
 
To capture the effect of family firm this study includes FAM_FIRM; a dummy variable 
that is one (1) if the firm is family firm and zero (0) otherwise. Second measure is 
family member (FAM_MEM) who is board of director. The first measure which is 
applied in this has been widely used in prior research (i.e.  Anderson & Reeb 2003; 
Gomez-Mejia et al. 2003; Maury 2006). Furthermore, this study include an interaction 
variable (REM*FAM_FIRM) to capture the moderating effect of director remuneration 
involvement in family firm on performance. Firms are identified as family-owned if the 
board of director has a blood relationship with the largest ultimate shareholder and at 
the same time holds direct or indirect voting rights exceeding 20%.iii 
 
To calculate this fraction (i.e. direct and indirect shareholding) the information was 
provided in annual report under shareholdings statistic – list of thirty (30) largest 
shareholders. The information is stack from the largest shareholding to less including 
firms or individual then determinate family member those who are holding more than 
5 per cent categorize as family firm. Saleh et al (2009) explain that the percentage of 
ownership is used to links with degree of family involvement in the firm which is tends 
to influence remuneration and performance.  
 
3.4 Control Variables 
 
For the purpose of this study, industry and firm characteristics (variables) are 
controlled, which includes firm size, industry, debt and firm age.  Firm size is 
measured by the natural log of the book value of total assets which similar with prior 
studies (i.e. Anderson & Reeb 2003; Chalmers et al. 2006; Maury 2006; Mehran 
1995). Accordingly to Anderson & Reeb (2003) investigate the relation between 
founding-family ownership and firm performance by using data from the S&P 500 and 
control the firm size which is measures by the natural log of the book value of total 
assets.  Consistent  study  by Chalmers et al (2006) measure the firm size by the 
natural logarithm of firm`s assets on their study related to the factors of determination 
CEO compensation. 
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The firm age need to be control due to significant impact to this research. Firm age is 
measure base on Initial Public Offer (IPO). Public listed companies will announce 
IPO for public after incorporate to increase capital.  Firm age is measured by the 
different year of Initial Public Offer (IPO) which is the first sale of stock by company to 
public and the current year. Relation of this, shows that the firm is considered run the 
business after gain the capital via IPO. 
  
Next, variable to be control is industry which is measured by dummy variables that 
differentiate between industrial sectors; "1" is for the consumer products sector; 
trading/service sector; construction; plantations/mining; and "0" if others such as 
banking, finance and insurance which are not included in this study and already 
discuss previously.  The researchers (Carrasco-Hernandez & Sanchez-Marin 2007; 
Martinez et al. 2007) control this variable in their study investigates characterize 
employee compensation in family firms by using dummy variable between industrial, 
consumer, trading/service, construction, properties, plantation and mining (1) and 
otherwise (0).  
 
Financial problem is significant to reduce director remuneration compared with strong 
financial. This shows that to control debt variable is necessity in many studies 
(Anderson & Reeb 2003; Cheung et al. 2005; Martinez et al. 2007).  Debt variable is 
measure by capital structure dividing long-term debt by total assets (Anderson & 
Reeb 2003).  Cheung et al (2005) investigates the concentration of ownership and 
executive compensation, sample 412 from Hong Kong firms during 1995 to 1998 by 
control debt variables where a measure is long-term debt divided by total assets. 
 
Data of firm size and debts were extracted from annual report under section financial 
balance sheet and profit and loss account.  Furthermore, information links to industry 
where the data was extracted from Bursa Malaysia under section listed companies 
sub section annual reports disclosure with few icons such as by financial year, by 
date, by company, by board and by sector. For this research, types of industries were 
obtained under icon sector such as construction, plantations mining, finance and 
others. Furthermore, age of incorporate obtained from annual report under section 
Initial Public Offer (IPO). Under this section the information directly mentions the 
current, historical and archives, also under sub section highlight by date and by 
company.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistic and Correlation Matrix  
  
Panel A of Table 4.1 exhibits the descriptive statistics related to director 
remunerations. Total director remuneration averages RM2.120 million, with a 
maximum of RM70.347 million. Further, the mean (median) for executive 
remuneration and non executive remuneration is RM1.854 (RM1.135) million and RM 
265,000 (RM160,000) respectively. In addition, components of executive 
remuneration are consists of fees and allowance, salary, bonus and benefit of kin 
averages RM91,000, RM1.359 million, RM219,000 and RM184,000 respectively.  
Furthermore, components of non executive remuneration are consists of fees and 
allowance, salary, bonus and benefit of kin averages RM185,000, RM51,000, 
RM11,000 and RM17,000 respectively. The descriptive findings suggest the obvious 
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that firms allocate more remuneration for executive remuneration rather than non 
executive remuneration.  
 
Panel C of Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the performance 
components. Return on Assets indicate mean (median) is 0.030 (0.037), with 
maximum is 1.426. Furthermore, mean (median) of Return on Equity is 0.044 
(0.061), with maximum 3.004. Panel D of Table 4.1 presents the firm characteristic 
results. Average of firm size is RM19.542 million, with maximum RM24.496 million. 
Others firm characteristic are debt which mean (median) is RM140,000  (RM85,000), 
with maximum RM3.897 million.  Furthermore, mean (median) of firm age is 13 (12) 
years, with maximum 48 years respectively.  
 
Table 6.2 presents the Pearson correlations for the test variables. Executive 
remuneration (EXECREM) and non-executive remuneration (NEDREM) were 
positively and significantly correlated with director remuneration (DIRREM) with 
significance levels at 0.01. (r = 0.996 and r = 0.277, respectively). Furthermore, ROA 
and ROE were both positively and significantly related to director remuneration (r = 
0.101, p < 0.01; r = 0.100, p < 0.01). ROA and ROE were also positively and 
significantly correlated to executive remuneration (r = 0.095, p = 0.05; r = 0.095, p < 
0.01), providing support to our hypothesis, director remuneration is motivated director 
to achieve better performance. 
 
Table 6.2 exhibits the Pearson correlation related to family firm ownership. The 
results showed that director remuneration and executive remuneration were not 
correlated with family firm ownership. However, non-executive remuneration was 
negatively and significantly related to family firm ownership (r = -0.103, p < 0.01). 
Similarly director remuneration and executive remuneration were not correlated with 
direct shareholding and indirect shareholding by family members, but non-executive 
remuneration was negatively and significantly correlated to direct and indirect 
shareholding (r = -0.108, p < 0.01; r = -0.061, p < 0.05). Furthermore, director and 
executive remuneration were positively and significantly correlated to number of 
family members in family firm (r = 0.060, p < 0.05; r = 0.067, p < 0.01). In contrast, 
the correlation between non-executive remuneration and family members was 
negative and significant (r = -0.063, p < 0.05). Family members and indirect 
shareholding had a positive and significant correlation with ROA (r = 0.071, p = 0.05; 
r = 0.084, p < 0.01). Similarly, family firm was positive correlated related to ROA (r = 
0.062, p < 0.05) and indirect shareholding was positively correlated with ROE (r = 
0.050, p < 0.05).  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistic 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation  
Minimum Maximum 
Panel A:Director Remuneration  
DIRREM       (million) 
EXECREM    (million) 
EXECFEES   (million) 
EXECSAL     (million) 
EXECBON    (million) 
EXECBEN    (million) 
NEDREM     (million) 
NEDFEES    (million) 
NEDSAL      (million) 
NEDBON     (million) 
NEDBEN     (million) 
 
2.120 
1.854 
0.091 
1.359 
0.219 
0.184 
0.265 
0.185 
0.051 
0.011 
0.017 
 
1.385 
1.135 
0.024 
0.897 
0.000 
0.039 
0.160 
0.134 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
4.059 
3.971 
0.213 
3.373 
1.170 
1.072 
0.381 
0.196 
0.211 
0.078 
0.114 
 
0.045 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
70.347 
69.621 
2.130 
68.851 
32.111 
38.165 
5.035 
2.074 
3.588 
1.466 
3.423 
 
Panel B: Family Firm  
FAM_MEM 
DIR_SHARES 
INDIR_SHARES 
 
1.450 
6.787 
14.445 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1.703 
13.402 
20.864 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
6.000 
66.400 
84.250 
Panel C: Performance 
ROA 
ROE 
 
0.030 
0.044 
 
0.037 
0.061 
 
0.122 
0.305 
 
--1.139 
-4.085 
 
1.426 
3.004 
 
Panel D: Control Variables  
SIZE 
DEBT 
AGE 
19.542 
0.140 
13.83 
19.417 
0.085 
12.000 
1.317 
0.203 
10.824 
11.755 
0.000 
0.000 
24.496 
3.897 
48.000 
Notes: EXECREM and NEDREM are executive and non-executive director remuneration respectively, 
DIRREM is the total director remuneration respectively.  EXECFEES, EXECSAL, EXECBON AND EXECBEN 
are executive director fees and allowances, salary, bonus and benefit of kin.. NEDFES, NEDSAL, NEDBON 
AND NEDBEN  are non-executive director  fees and allowances, salary, bonus and benefit of kin respectively. 
FAM_MEM is family member as in board of director. DIR_SHARES and INDIR_SHARES are direct and 
indirect shareholding in family firm ROA is the net income divided by total assets. ROE is the net income 
divided by total equity. DEBT is the long term debt over total assets. SIZE is logarithm of total assets and AGE 
is number of year since incorporate.  
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Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix 
 
Pearson (in shaded area) correlations are reported in the table: EXECREM and NEDREM are executive and non-executive director remuneration; DIRREM is the 
total director remuneration respectively. FAM_MEM is family member as in board of director. FAM_FIRM is a dummy with 1= family firm and 0= non family firm. 
DIR_SHARES and INDIR_SHARES are direct and indirect shareholding in family firm.  ASSETS total assets. ROA is the net income divided by total assets. ROE 
is the net income divided by total equity. Debt is the long term debt over total assets. SIZE is logarithm of total assets and AGE is number of year since 
incorporate. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 DIRREM EXECREM NEDREM FAM_MEM FAM_FIRMS DIR_SHARES INDIR_SHARES ROA ROE SIZE DEBT AGE IND 
DIRREM              
EXECREM .996
**
             
NEDREM .277
**
 .187
**
            
FAM_MEM .060
*
 .067
**
 -.063
*
           
FAM_FIRMS .020 .030 -.103
**
 .896
**
          
DIR_SHARES -.039 -.029 -.108
**
 .461
**
 .532
**
         
INDIR_SHARES .041 .047 -.061
*
 .719
**
 .727
**
 .140
**
        
ROA .101
**
 .095
**
 .089
**
 .071
**
 .062
*
 .015 .084
**
       
ROE .100
**
 .095
**
 .076
**
 .022 .010 -.027 .050
*
 .640
**
      
SIZE .357
**
 .334
**
 .315
**
 .003 -.033 -.124
**
 .054
*
 .187
**
 .158
**
     
DEBT .067
**
 .065
**
 .029 -.065
**
 -.084
**
 -.041 -.075
**
 -.037 -.034 .108
**
    
AGE -.005 -.003 -.028 -.016 -.039 .054
*
 .005 .014 -.002 .038 -.026   
IND -.008 .004 -.120
**
 .076
**
 .076
**
 .079
**
 .091
**
 .021 -.005 -.069
**
 .015 -.010  
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4.2 Multivariate Analysis  
 
Table 4.3 exhibits univariate analysis for the test variables between family firm and 
non family firm. Panel A of Table 6.3 reports that director remuneration is higher in 
family firm (RM2.206 million) than non family firm (RM2.042 million). The univariate 
test provided initial support for a positive relationship between family firm and 
director remuneration. The results present that fees and bonus of family executive 
are higher (RM112,000 and RM301,000) compare with non family firm, (RM72,000 
and RM144,000). The measures of director remuneration higher in family firm 
providing initial support of existing family members influencing on board 
remuneration. Following results exhibit that remuneration and fees for non executive 
are higher (RM303,000 and RM221,000) in non family firm than family firm 
(RM224,000 and RM145,000), suggesting non executive better pay is more 
prevalent in relation to non family firm.  
 
The result present that performance measure by Return on Asset is better in family 
firm (0.038) than non family firm (0.023). Furthermore, a relationship between size of 
firm and family firm is significant with p < 0.05. The results also indicate that Debt is 
higher (RM156,000) in non family firm rather than family firm (RM122,000) but 
insignificant of age of incorporation. 
 
Table 4.4 present extended results on relationship between remuneration and firm 
performance. Table 4.4 exhibit the results of regression related to explanatory 
variables determination of firm performance. This study find that the coefficient of 
DIRREM on column 1 positive and significantly (0.021; t = 5.719 and p < 0.05) 
related to ROA.  Similar results shows on column 5, the relationship between 
DIRREM and ROE is positive and significantly (0.043; t = 4.744 and p < 0.05). 
Furthermore, regression on column 2 shows that EXECREM is positive and 
significantly (0.015; t = 4.887 and p < 0.05) related to ROA. Evidence shows that 
regression on column 5 is significant positive (0.032; t = 4.279 and p < 0.05) 
between EXECREM and ROE.  Other component of director remuneration is non 
executive remuneration which is positive and significant related to ROA and ROE. 
This study finds that NEDREM has influence on firm performance.  Result of 
regression on table 4.4 show that relationship between NEDREM and ROA is 
positive and significantly (0.014; t = 3.958 and p < 0.05).  Furthermore, column 6 
shows that NEDREM is positive and significantly (0.022; t = 2.533 and p < 0.05) 
related to ROE.  
 
This study finds evidence that the director remuneration is significant positive on 
performance. Further study also shows evidence that executive and non executive 
remuneration are significant influences on firm performance. This providing support 
our hypothesis that director remuneration influences performances, consistent with 
agency theory (Fama 1980; Jensen & Meckling 1976). Further analysis suggest that 
the nature of firm providing better remuneration and motivate director to work harder 
and tries to find creative ways to enhance performance. Therefore, they tend to use 
their skills, expertise and experience during carry on business operation. 
Doucouliagos et al. (2007) find no evidence that director remuneration is sensitive 
towards poor performance rather than better performance. Our study suggests that 
executive in public listed firms pay attention in order to enhance firm performance 
when they are satisfaction with remuneration. Previous study shows that there is a 
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weak positive relationship between director remuneration and performance in 
Malaysian firms before and during the Asian Financial Crisis (i.e., 1996 to 1998) 
(Hassan et al. 2003).  
 
Table 4.3: Univariate Analysis of Differences Variables between Family Firm 
and Non Family Firm in Malaysia Public Listed 
 (n=762) 
Family Firm = 
1 Mean 
(n=849) 
Non Family Firm = 0  
Mean 
 
t – Test 
p - Value 
 
Mann Whitney  
p - Value 
Panel A:Director Remuneration   
DIRREM     (million) 
EXECREM  (million) 
EXECFESS (million) 
EXECSAL  (million) 
EXECBON (million) 
EXECBEN  (million) 
NEDREM   (million) 
NEDFEES  (million) 
NEDSAL    (million) 
NEDBON   (million) 
NEDBEN   (million) 
2.206 
1.981 
0.112 
1.361 
0.301 
0.205 
0.224 
0.145 
0.051 
0.008 
0.018 
2.042 
1.739 
0.072 
1.435 
0.144 
0.166 
0.303 
0.221 
0.051 
0.013 
0.016 
0.421 
0.223 
0.000 
0.976 
0.010 
0.469 
0.000 
0.000 
0.952 
0.219 
0.780 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.329 
0.000 
0.000 
0.665 
0.074 
0.133 
 
Panel B: Performance  
ROA 
ROE 
 
0.038 
0.047 
 
0.023 
0.041 
 
0.011 
0.695 
 
0.064 
0.684 
 
Panel C: Control Variables   
SIZE 
DEBT 
AGE 
IND 
19.496 
0.122 
13.39 
0.95 
19.583 
0.156 
14.23 
0.91 
0.186 
0.001 
0.122 
0.002 
0.030 
0.001 
0.149 
0.002 
Notes:  Firms are formed based on family firm, whereby FAM_FIRMS takes the value of 1 for family firms and 
zero otherwise. EXECREM and NEDREM are executive and non-executive director remuneration; DIRREM is 
the total director remuneration respectively. EXECFEES, EXECSAL, EXECBON and  EXECBEN are executive 
fees, salary, bonus and benefit of kind. NEDFEES, NEDSAL, NEDBON and  NEDBEN are non executive director 
fees, salary, bonus and benefit of kind.  IND is "1" is for the consumer products sector; trading/service sector; 
construction; plantations/mining; and "0" if others.  Debt is the long term debt over total assets. SIZE is logarithm 
of total assets and AGE is number of year since incorporate. Significant p-values are bold 
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Table 4.4: Determination of Firm Performances by Remuneration  
 ROA ROE 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
DIRREM 
 
0.21 
5.719** 
   
0.043 
4.744** 
  
EXECREM  0.015 
4.887** 
  0.032 
4.279** 
 
NEDREM   0.014 
3.958** 
  0.022 
2.533** 
SIZE 0.012 
4.564** 
0.014 
5.582** 
0.013 
5.106** 
0.024 
3.808** 
0.028 
4.578** 
0.030 
4.617** 
DEBT -0.032 
-2.184** 
-0.033 
-2.230** 
-0.035 
-2.362** 
-0.071 
-1.934** 
-0.073 
-1.967** 
-0.077 
-2.089** 
AGE 0.000 
0.295 
0.000 
0.252 
0.000 
0.366 
0.000 
-0.335 
0.000 
-0.369 
0.000 
-0.298 
IND 0.018 
1.479 
0.017 
1.416 
0.020 
1.686 
0.009 
0.297 
0.007 
0.245 
0.013 
0.433 
CONSTANT -0.502 
-9.182** 
-0.455 
-8.672** 
-0.411 
-8.170** 
-1.035 
-7.538** 
-0.949 
-7.222** 
-0.810 
-6.418** 
       
Adjusted R²   
 F-statistic 
0.056 
20.045** 
0.051 
18.208** 
0.046 
16.497** 
0.038 
13.775** 
0.036 
12.911** 
0.029 
10.464** 
       
Cross-sections 537 537 537 537 537 537 
Total 
observation   
1611 1611 1611 1611 1611 1611 
EXECREM and NEDREM are executive and non-executive director remuneration; DIRREM is the total director 
remuneration respectively. DEBT is the long term debt over total assets. SIZE is logarithm of total assets, AGE is 
number of year since incorporate and IND is types of industries. t – Statistics are italicised.  ** denote 5 percent 
significant levels respectively. 
 
 
Table 4.5 indicates no evidence the interaction between DIRREM*FAM_FIRM 
influence on firm performance.  Column 1 shows that the interaction between 
DIRREM*FAM_FIRM is positive and insignificant related to ROA. However, results of 
regression on column 2 exhibit that the interaction between DIRREM*FAM_FIRM is 
negative but insignificant links to ROE. This not providing support our hypothesis the 
introduction of family firm influences director remuneration and performance. Further 
analysis finds no evidence show that the family firm manipulated a power and control 
for personal interest. Family members are very happy with remuneration that is 
proposed, as recommended by MCCG, which recommends a strong link between 
remuneration and performance and abilities of board members.  
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Table 4.5: Regression Results of Performance by Interaction between Director 
Remuneration and Family Firm 
  ROA  
(1) 
ROE  
(2) 
 
DIRREM 
 
0.018 
3.959** 
 
0.035 
3.143** 
FAM_FIRM 0.010 
1.574 
-0.007 
-0.450 
DIRREM*FAM_FIRM 0.005 
0.748 
-0.021 
-1.278 
SIZE 0.012 
4.688** 
0.024 
3.712** 
DEBT -0.031 
-2.082** 
-0.075 
-2.012** 
AGE 0.000 
0.323 
0.000 
-0.407 
IND 0.016 
1.331 
0.009 
0.293 
CONSTANT -0.471 
-7.048** 
-0.914 
-5.449** 
   
Adjusted R²    0.057  0.038  
F-statistic 14.777** 10.093** 
   
Cross-sections  537  537 
Total observation       1611          1611 
Notes:  DIRREM is the total director remuneration respectively. FAM_FIRM is a dummy with 
1= family firm and 0= non family firm.  ROA is the net income divided by total assets. ROE is 
the net income divided by total equity. DEBT is the long term debt over total assets. SIZE is 
logarithm of total assets, AGE is number of year since incorporate and IND is types of 
industries. t – Statistics are italicised.  ** denote 5 percent significant levels respectively.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This study examines the relationship between the remuneration committee and 
director remuneration in Malaysian family firms. In the sample of 537 firms listed in 
Bursa Malaysia with 1611 pieces of panel data from 2007 and 2009, we find 
evidence that board of director is motivate to work harder in order to enhance firm 
performance when they are satisfaction with remuneration. Our study suggests that 
remuneration provided to director in firm listed on Bursa Malaysia regarding on skills, 
experience and expertise which suggested by governance regulation and best 
practices by MCCG 2007 (revised).  However, this study does not find evidence a 
relationship between director remuneration and performance influenced by family 
firm. Our study suggest that the nature of firm is when performance keep improved 
and beneficial is gain by family firm and there is no reason for expropriation in firms 
listed on Bursa Malaysia. Therefore, family members do not manipulate their 
positions of power on boards of directors and as majority shareholders to increase 
remuneration for personal benefit.  
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The limitation of the study is some data is less meaningful although presented 
because is not fulfill requirement of research methodology in this study.  However, 
this uncollected data which is probability enable to generalize the results. 
Remuneration committee is responsibility on design remuneration for director should 
links to performance. Further research could be done to investigate the influence of 
the remuneration committee on the relationship between director remuneration and 
performance.  
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 www.bursamalaysia.com. 
ii
  refer to address on  
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/resources/download/brochure_listing_bursa.pdf) 
iii
 This definition is consistent with other researchers. For example, Claessens and colleagues (2002) define the family firm as when there is 
presence of a group of people related by blood or marriage with large ownership stakes. Furthermore, Gomez-Mejia and colleagues (2003) 
define family firm under two condition: First, two or more directors have a family relationship and family members own or control at least 
5% of the voting stock. Family relationships include father, mother, sister, brother, son, daughter, spouse, in-laws, aunt, uncle, niece nephew 
and cousin. Second, family-controlled and CEO is a family member/percentage of family equity ownership/family controlled and family 
member(s) are on the compensation committee. Next, La Porta and colleagues (1999) define a family firm if a person is the controlling 
shareholder (ultimate owner) whose direct and indirect voting rights exceed 20%. 
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